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Kong: The Art of Stripping

THE ART OF STRIPPING: HOW THE GOVERNMENT
APPLIES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO STRIP YOU OF YOUR
PROPERTY
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
RICHMOND COUNTY
In re City of New York1
(decided May 7, 2012)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiffs, Lawrence and Liana Paolella, owners of Staten
Island property consisting entirely of wetlands, challenged the taking
of their property that resulted from the implementation of the State of
New York’s Freshwater Wetlands regulations.2 The property was
acquired by the City of New York as part of the New Creek Bluebelt
Phase 4 project.3 These regulations required the Paolella property to
be left vacant, prohibiting any reasonable productive development of
the property.4 Plaintiffs brought suit after being denied a permit to
develop the property due to the enforcement of the State’s Freshwater
Wetlands regulations.5 In June 2007, the City of New York took title
of the Paolella property. A subsequent property condemnation proceeding was initiated and just compensation was to be determined for
the government’s taking of the Paolella property.6 At issue was the
amount sought by the Plaintiffs as just compensation.7 The Plaintiffs
alleged that the restrictions on their property, imposed by the State’s
1

In re City of New York, No. 4018/07, 2012 WL 1676889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2012).
Id. at *2.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *1-2; see id. at *2 (explaining how to calculate “just compensation” owed to property owners where they successfully show there was
a “regulatory taking” by the state).
7
Id. at *1.
2

479
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Freshwater Wetlands regulations, constituted a regulatory taking and
that the State failed to provide the Plaintiffs with just compensation,
in violation of Article I, section 7(a),8 of the New York State Constitution.9
Using the per se doctrine, the City argued that the property’s
economic value was not completely destroyed because there was
some demand for wetlands in the area.10 Hence, the court decided
that the regulation did not constitute a taking under the per se doctrine because the Plaintiffs did not suffer a total loss in value in the
property.11 While the Plaintiffs’ claim failed under the per se doctrine, it survived under the ad hoc doctrine.12 As set forth in Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,13 to determine a regulatory
taking under the ad hoc doctrine, the court balances three essential
factors: “(1) ‘[t]he economic impact of the government’s regulation
on the claimant,’ (2) ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment backed expectations,’ and (3) ‘the character
of the governmental action.’ ”14 Under this approach, the court must
balance each factor and make a determination based upon the extent
of the economic impact of the government’s regulation and the degree of interference the regulation has on the claimant’s property interests.15
In assessing the first factor, the character or nature of the governmental action, the court considered whether the regulation
“amount[ed] to a physical invasion or [whether it] merely affect[ed]
property interests to promote the common good.”16 The court found
that the wetlands regulations provided no benefit to the restricted
property owner, even though they did “provide a general public benefit.”17 Additionally, the regulation failed to benefit any owners of

8

N.Y. CONST. art. I, §7(a) (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”).
9
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *1.
10
Id. at *2-3.
11
Id. at *3.
12
Id. at *3-4.
13
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *3 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
15
Id. at *4 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005)).
16
Id. (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).
17
Id.
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property adjacent to the wetlands.18 Instead, the restriction disproportionately burdened a limited group of people, owners of wetlands.19
Further, the City failed to explain how the restrictions would promote
the common good.20 Of more importance, the court pointed out that
“the character of the regulations” prohibited all development of the
Plaintiffs’ property because they deprived the Plaintiffs of “any alternative uses that would provide a reasonable economic return.”21 Accordingly, this factor weighed in favor of the Plaintiffs because the
government restricted the Plaintiffs’ use of the property in a way that
did not further a public purpose.
Next, the court addressed the extent to which the regulation
interfered with distinct investment backed expectations maintained
by the Plaintiffs at the time they purchased the property.22 In order
for this factor to weigh in their favor, the Plaintiffs had to prove that
they purchased the property with a reasonable expectation of development or that they purchased the property for the purpose of development.23 The Plaintiffs merely argued that they owned the property
before the wetlands regulations were enforced and provided no investment backed expectations in the property.24 As a result, the argument failed to show evidence of any expectation the Plaintiffs had
for the property when they purchased it.25 Therefore, the court found
that this factor was not satisfied because the wetlands regulations
cannot interfere with non-existent expectations in the property.26
Finally, the court analyzed the economic impact of the wetlands regulation on the Plaintiffs’ inability to develop the property.27
The court first turned to Keystone Bituminous v. DeBenedictis.28 In
Keystone, the United States Supreme Court established that economic
impact was determined by evaluating the difference between the value that had been taken from the property and the value that remained
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id.
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.
Id.; Keystone Bituminous v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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in the property.29 In In re City of New York, the court ultimately
agreed with appraisal values produced by the City’s appraiser.30 The
value of the Plaintiffs’ property with the regulation was $185,000,
while the market value of the property, if it were not subject to the
regulation, was just over one million dollars.31 Simply put, by attaching the regulation to the wetland, the City caused the Plaintiffs’ property to drop in value by eighty-two percent.32 The next inquiry was
whether the eighty-two percent diminution in property value constituted a regulatory such that the Plaintiffs would be entitled to just
compensation.33
Accordingly, the court analyzed a number of federal and state
cases where courts balanced the factors under the ad hoc doctrine, together with the diminution in property value, and found that the regulations constituted regulatory takings.34 The court established that
diminished value alone would not establish a per se taking. However, the diminution in property value, together with the requirement
that the property remain vacant and be prohibited from any productive use would establish a regulatory taking that would require just
compensation.35 The court reasoned that the eighty-two percent diminution in Plaintiff’s property value, together with the regulation’s requirement that the property remain vacant, would deny the Plaintiffs
“any productive use of the property” and would likely result in a successful regulatory takings claim.36 Although an 82% diminution in
value was enough to constitute a taking in this case, state and federal
courts have never explicitly established a bright line percentage in
loss necessary to establish a taking. The question, therefore, must
turn on whether a particular diminution percentage can establish a
taking.

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497.
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *6.
Id.
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PROTECTING ECONOMIC RIGHTS UNDER THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE

Courts have the authority to decide whether the government
acquired private property for a public use.37 Initially, the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause applied only to the federal government. The United States Supreme Court, in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,38 dismissed a takings claim, reasoning that the Takings
Clause did not apply to the states because it was developed in response to fears of abuse by the federal government.39 The Court in
Penn Central established that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
was “made applicable to the [s]tates through [incorporation of the
Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment.”40 A state’s
power of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of the state’s police
power to protect its public “health, safety, and general welfare.”41
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, private
property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”42 The first requirement in the Takings Clause is that the private
property must “be taken for public use,” or public purpose.43 Public
use was defined as “the use which the public [may] freely . . . enter
upon . . . under terms common to all, [and] the right to use by the
public where everyone has the right to share in its benefits.”44 Under
the rational basis test, public purpose means that there must be a reasonable relationship between the taking and the purpose for the taking.45 The court examines (1) whether the taking advances a legiti37

D. Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 1312 (2010).
32 U.S. 243 (1833).
39
Id. at 250-51 (“[T]he [F]ifth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution, declaring that private
property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a
limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.”).
40
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 122 (citing Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897)).
41
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. 1936) (finding that if “the public health, safety, or general welfare” of the state is threatened, the government has the power
to do what is “necessary and appropriate”).
42
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43
Id.
44
Sidney Z. Searles, The Law of Eminent Domain in the U.S.A., C97 ALI-ABA 333, 338
(1995).
45
Keri Ann Kilcommons, A Survey of Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence: The Impact
of Del Monte Dunes on Nollan, Dolan, Agins, and Lucas, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 532, 540
38
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mate public purpose, such as protecting the public health, safety, or
general welfare; (2) whether the taking reasonably relates to that legitimate public purpose; and (3) whether the taking interferes with
the landowner’s investment-based expectations.46 Public use also encompasses any public advantage, including urban renewal, redevelopment of commercial areas, removal of undesirable living conditions, and revitalization of the economic community.47
The second requirement of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause is just compensation. Just compensation is made when the
landowner is paid the reasonable value of the property for the taking.48 Usually, fair market value is used to determine the reasonable
value.49 While there is no set formula for determining just compensation for a taking, it is usually determined “by comparing the property
[subject to the taking] with recent sale prices for similar property in
the same area.”50 The purpose of just compensation is to remedy a
loss to the landowner for the government’s encroachment on the
landowner’s property rights.51 Due process guarantees that hearings
will be held to determine the amount of compensation, but does not
require a trial by jury.52 Unlike most jurisdictions that allow a trial
by jury, either at the outset or after an appointed commissioner has
already decided the case, New York courts hold these hearings without a jury.53
While the judicial process differs among the states, the substantive law on the types of takings has remained the same. The
United States Supreme Court has long recognized two types of takings: physical takings and regulatory takings.54 A typical physical
(2001).
46
Id. at 541 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, LTD., 526 U.S.
687, 702 (1999)).
47
Searles, supra note 44, at 341 (quoting People ex rel. Urbana v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915,
920-21 (Ill. 1977)).
48
Id. at 344.
49
Id. at 344-45.
50
Id. at 344.
51
Id.
52
Searles, supra note 44, at 356.
53
Id.
54
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (concluding that a cable television line, notwithstanding its minor occupation of property, constituted a physical taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (reasoning that
a coastal protection law, preventing the landowner from building houses, was a regulatory
taking).
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taking “is a direct government appropriation . . . of private property”
that must be compensated.55 A regulatory taking occurs when the
government “goes too far” in regulating the use of property so that it
becomes onerous to the landowner.56 A regulatory taking may also
occur if the governmental regulation strips the property of “all economically beneficial us[e].”57 The government need not pay compensation for regulating the use of property; compensation is required
only if the regulation constitutes a regulatory taking.58
The following case note focuses on regulatory takings and
evaluates the different approaches used in federal and state courts.
Specifically, it will focus on weighing the governmental regulation’s
economic impact on the property’s remaining use and value under the
ad hoc approach. Additionally, this case note will discuss the significance of federal and subsequent state court decisions made in In re
City of New York. Finally, this note will examine the policy issues
involving the absence of a bright-line rule for evaluating a taking
based on a regulation’s impact on the remaining economic value of
property.
III.

FEDERAL PRECEDENT

The seminal case establishing the test for a regulatory taking
was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.59 The issue in Pennsylvania
Coal was whether, under the Kohler Act, the government could take
away Pennsylvania Coal Company’s rights to mine their own property.60 The Kohler Act prohibited “the mining of anthracite coal in
such a way . . . [that] cause[d] the subsidence of” residential struc55
Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes
Taking of Property Requiring Compensation Under Takings clause of Fifth Amendment to
United States Constitution—Supreme Court Cases, 10 A.L.R. FED. 2d 231 (2006).
56
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[R]egulation may be . . . so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster . . . .”)).
57
Id. at 538 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58
See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (“[W]here the government merely
regulates the use of property, compensation is required only if considerations such as the
purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of
the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a
burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.”).
59
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
60
Id. at 412 (pointing out that the coal company owned both the subsurface property and
the surface property).
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tures, unless the surface was owned by the same owner of the underlying coal.61 The Court concluded that enforcement of the Kohler
Act was a regulatory taking that required just compensation because
the government had extended its police power “too far.”62 It reasoned that the Act deprived the plaintiff of all previously existing
property interests.63 This total deprivation was tantamount to a permanent physical invasion, as if the government was taking away all
of the coal from the plaintiff.64 Thus, as a result of the Act, the economic impact and interference with the property owner’s expectation
to generate income was substantially affected.65 The private property
was valuable because the plaintiff was entitled to mine and profit
from the subsurface coal.66 Enforcement of the regulation against
Pennsylvania Coal Company was equivalent to destroying the property and depriving the owners of any use of the property for which it
was acquired.67 The Court also found that because the property was
privately owned, the Act could not be sustained because the private
act of mining resulted in no interference with the public interest.68
More than half a decade after Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court recognized regulatory takings under an ad hoc approach.
The United States Supreme Court, in Penn Central, addressed the issue of whether a New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, which
placed restrictions on the development of individual historic landmarks, constituted a taking, and thus, required the payment of just
compensation.69 In Penn Central, the plaintiffs sued the defendant
for denying their application to construct a fifty-five-story expansion
on top of Grand Central Terminal and a fifty-three-story expansion
that required tearing down a part of the terminal.70 The trial court
granted an injunction to the plaintiffs, barring the defendant from im61

Id. at 412-13.
Id. at 415-16.
63
Id. at 413.
64
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (specifying that when a regulation becomes so onerous, the government must exercise eminent domain and just compensation to constitutionally enforce the regulation).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 414.
67
Id. at 415.
68
Id. at 413-14 (“A source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance . . . . The
damage is not common or public . . . . [T]he surface is owned by the owner of the coal.”).
69
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 107.
70
Id. at 116-17.
62
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peding the plaintiffs’ construction of any structure above the terminal.71 The trial court also awarded the plaintiffs declaratory relief of
damages for the time during which the plaintiffs were prevented from
constructing a building.72 Defendant appealed the judgment and the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed, holding that
the Landmarks Preservation Law was instituted for the public purpose of protecting landmarks.73 The plaintiffs appealed and the New
York Court of Appeals held that there was no taking, in part, because
the landmark regulation permitted the terminal continue being used
as a terminal, the plaintiffs failed to show they could not earn a reasonable return on their investment in the terminal, and the development rights above the terminal remained valuable to the plaintiffs if
they developed a suitable construction plan similar to plans developed by nearby office buildings.74 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reviewed all of the factual inquiries and applied the
Penn Central factors to determine whether there was a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment.75 Those factors included the economic impact of the regulation on the plaintiffs, the extent of the regulation’s interference with the plaintiffs’ “distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and the “character of the governmental action.”76 Because there is no formula for determining when a governmental regulation goes “too far,” and thus constitutes a taking, courts consider
the facts on a case by case basis.
First, the Court reviewed the character of the regulation.77
The regulation was enacted to “enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of [the] city.”78 The
Court indicated that preservation of specific structures and areas with
historic significance was a permissible governmental goal.79 It rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that any regulation imposed on individual landmarks constitutes a taking, requiring just compensation.80
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 121-22.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
Id. at 128-29.
Id.
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 108, 129.
Id. at 131.
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The Court reasoned that “preservation of landmarks benefits all New
York citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving
the quality of life in the city as a whole.”81 Second, the Court found
that the regulation did not interfere with the plaintiffs’ distinct investment-backed expectations in the property because Grand Central
Terminal’s “designation as a landmark” permitted its continued use
“as a railroad terminal [with] office space and concessions.”82 The
plaintiffs were still able to obtain a reasonable return on their investment even where the terminal remained a railroad terminal.83
Lastly, the Court weighed the economic value of the property.
The plaintiffs argued that they could no longer effectively use the
space above the terminal and that, as a result, the regulation diminished the profits that would have been derived from the construction
of the fifty-five-story office building.84 The Court found, however,
that a reduction in property value alone could not establish a taking.85
It also found that the economic impact of the regulation was minimal
because the plaintiffs could still build a structure above the terminal.86 Therefore, the plaintiffs’ possible profits were not completely
diminished.87 The defendant merely denied the plaintiffs’ request to
construct a fifty-five-story structure because it could damage the
character of the Terminal.88 Further, the Court pointed out that the
plaintiffs also retained its pre-existing air rights, which could be
transferred for a valuable amount.89 After weighing all three factors,
the Court held that the defendant’s Landmarks Preservation Law was
not a regulatory taking of the plaintiffs’ property.90
The Supreme Court later recognized the per se approach, in
which an automatic regulatory taking could be established under particular circumstances. This approach was established in Lucas v.

81

Id. 134.
Id. at 136.
83
Id.
84
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136.
85
Id. at 131.
86
Id. at 137.
87
Id. at 136-37 (suggesting that the Commission did not prohibit any type of construction
above the terminal).
88
Id.
89
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137.
90
Id. at 138.
82
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South Carolina Coastal Council.91 In Lucas, the plaintiff bought two
beachfront lots in 1986 with the purpose of building residential units
on those two lots.92 The Beachfront Management Act was enacted in
1988, and barred plaintiff from building any type of permanent habitable structures on those two parcels.93 The Court held that the regulation completely destroyed the plaintiff’s property value and denied
him all economically beneficial and productive use in his property.94
It reasoned that when the landowner sacrifices “all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good,” thus leaving the
land economically idle, the landowner has suffered a taking.95
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,96 the Court rejected the ad hoc approach and instead employed a rough proportionality test. 97 Under
this test, where the government creates a regulation that requires a
property owner to dedicate his property to governmental use, the
government must present evidence that the loss to the owner is
roughly proportionate to the public interest served by the regulation.98
If the government fails to make this “sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed development,” then the government has
not met its burden and a taking is found.99 The Court held that the
City failed to make an individualized determination for a policy to
support the pathway and floodplain dedications.100 It reasoned, specifically, that the City failed to make any findings that a bicyclepedestrian pathway would resolve traffic congestion.101 The Court
further reasoned that there was no reasonable relationship between
the city’s floodplain easement and the landowner’s proposed development because the proposed development would not encroach on
any of the City’s existing space.102 The heightened scrutiny under the
91

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1006-07.
93
Id. at 1007.
94
Id. at 1029.
95
Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original). The Court points out that this per se rule applies absent long-standing common law or nuisance statute. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30.
96
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
97
Id. at 389.
98
Id. at 389-90.
99
Id. at 391.
100
Id.
101
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395.
102
Id. at 394.
92
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rough proportionality test forces local governments to “prepare detailed research reports and present complex calculations [and] bear
heavy costs in preparing such detailed reports.”103
More recently, the Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.104
recognized two approaches that a challenge against a governmental
regulation as a regulatory taking could be made.105 The per se theory
established by Lucas may be used when a governmental regulation
completely deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial” use of
the property.106 The ad hoc theory, established by Penn Central, applies when a governmental regulation does not completely deprive an
owner of all economically beneficial use of the property, but instead
allows a court to evaluate the three Penn Central factors to determine
whether the governmental regulation effects a regulatory taking requiring just compensation.107
Before 1815, only eight states had adopted takings clauses,
and, as a result, there was a scarcity of cases interpreting state takings
clauses.108 Today, many states have adopted the principals of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and most state takings clauses now closely paralleled the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.109
New York, specifically, has consistently used both the ad hoc categorical approach and the per se rule, found in the respective paradigmatic takings clause cases, Penn Central and Lucas.110

103

Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative And Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 244-45 (2000).
104
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
105
Id. at 548.
106
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
107
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (specifying the three factors to be the economic impact of
the regulation, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable investmentbacked expectations, and the character of governmental action); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538
(pointing out that in the absence of any set formula, the Penn Central factors are used to
evaluate regulatory takings claims).
108
FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND
WITHOUT PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 106-07 (U.S. Government Printing Office
1973); Nicole Garnett, No Taking Without A Touching: Questions from an Armchair
Originalist, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 761, 773 (2008).
109
Garnett, supra note 108, at 774.
110
Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating from the “Rule of
Law”, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 380-81 (1998).
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NEW YORK STATE PRECEDENT

New York courts have often adopted the ad hoc approach to
determine whether governmental regulations constituted regulatory
takings. In addition, the New York Constitution allows regulatory
takings if they are made with just compensation.111 New York courts
have consistently explained that in order for a landowner to successfully establish a regulatory taking, he must show that the governmental regulation barred him from using his property for the purpose for
which it was acquired.112 This resembles the Penn Central ad hoc
approach based upon reasonable investment-backed expectations in
the property. To satisfy this burden, the landowner must provide detailed evidence of the economic return that he or she expected from
his projected usage of the land.113 Because the United States Supreme Court has not set a bright line rule for evaluating the regulation’s economic impact on the property, New York state courts weigh
heavily on the property’s remaining economic uses. That is not to
say that New York courts do not consider the diminution in value of
the property.
Courts in New York may sometimes give greater weight to
diminution in property value than they give to possible economic uses. In Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. State,114 the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court held that the State’s condemnation of plaintiff’s property under the New York State Tidal
Wetlands Act could be successfully challenged as a regulatory taking.115 Plaintiff owned 5.91 acres of land classified as tidal wet111

N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (providing in pertinent part: “Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.”).
112
De St. Aubin v. Flacke, 496 N.E.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. 1986) (suggesting that once the
town denies, with prejudice, the landowner’s request for a permit to develop his property
into single-family residences, the regulation then precludes the landowner from using his
land for the purpose for which it was acquired); Spears v. Berle, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 1308
(N.Y. 1979) (explaining that in determining whether a regulation barred the landowner from
using his land for the purpose for which it was purchased, courts consider evidence of the
property’s value, purchase price, the uses for which it may have been acquired, or the possible gains from permitted uses).
113
Spears, 397 N.E.2d at 1308; see also De St. Aubin, 496 N.E.2d at 885 (“[T]he property
owner must show by ‘dollar and cents’ evidence that under no use permitted by the regulation under attack would the properties be capable of producing a reasonable economic return
. . . .”).
114
497 N.Y.S.2d 983 (App. Div. 1984).
115
Id. at 986.
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lands.116 The State enacted the Tidal Wetlands Act,117 which proscribed residential use of the property, and subsequently appropriated
the plaintiff’s property for environmental purposes.118 Consequently,
the plaintiffs sued the State for compensation for the regulatory taking. The Appellate Division agreed that, under the Tidal Wetlands
Act, the “highest and best use” of the property was recreational at
most.119
The ‘diminution in property’ value was used by the court, in
tandem with the impact on the economic use of the property, to determine whether a regulatory taking existed. The court agreed that,
with the regulation intact, the property’s value was worth $7,400.120
Conversely, without the regulation, the property would be worth
about $53,781.121 The regulation reduced plaintiff’s property value
by 86% and thus deprived plaintiff of all financially rewarding uses
of the property by restricting it to recreational usage. 122 Under these
circumstances, the 86% diminution in property value and the regulation’s limit on the property to be used solely for recreational purposes
provided a reasonable probability that there would likely be a successful constitutional challenge to the regulation as a regulatory taking.123
In Friedenburg v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation,124 the court reviewed the regulation’s effect on
the property’s economic value in tandem with its effect on the property’s economic use. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of
Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) wetlands regulations, which
proscribed utilization of the waterfront property, as a regulatory taking which required just compensation.125 The 2.5-acre parcel was
purchased in 1962, and passed to the owner’s estate, the plaintiffs, in
116

Id. at 985.
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 661.1 (1977).
118
Chase Manhattan Bank, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 985 (claiming that the drainage on the wetlands was poor, that mosquito ditches infested area, and tidal flow was present under or
around the property).
119
Id. at 990 (stating that it based this conclusion on the State’s appraiser who valued the
property at $7,400 according to the restrictions of the Tidal Wetlands Act).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 991.
122
Id. at 992.
123
Chase Manhattan Bank, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
124
767 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div. 2003).
125
Id. at 453.
117
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1973.126 The plaintiffs were denied a permit to construct a singlefamily residence multiple times. In 1989 the Village of Southampton
adopted the DEC’s wetlands regulations, which restricted any development of the property.127 Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought suit
against the DEC, and requested permission for the building; in the alternative, the plaintiffs sought payment for a violation of the Takings
Clause.128 The New York Appellate Division applied the ad hoc factors pursuant to Penn Central, and held that the restrictions constituted a regulatory taking.129 It reasoned that the property value was reduced by 95%, and the property could no longer be used for the
purpose for which it was purchased because the regulations required
that the property be left in its natural state.130
Unlike the court in Friendenburg, some courts do not find a
reduction in property value to be a compelling factor. In Gazza v.
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation,131 a regulatory takings issue arose when the landowner purchased property
knowing that it had been designated as protected tidal wetlands, and
was denied a building permit for a residence.132 The court examined
the facts under the ad hoc approach and held that the regulation did
not constitute a taking.133 It then reasoned that there was no investment-backed interest of the landowner in building a house at the time
he purchased the property, because he knew the property was designated tidal wetlands.134 Furthermore, the property’s economic value
126

Id.
Id.
128
Id.
129
Friedenburg, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 458 (stating that the three factors used to determine
whether there was a regulatory taking are “the economic impact of the regulation, the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and
the character of governmental action”); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (explaining that
the character of the government action considers whether such action is a physical invasion
by the government or an interference with a public purpose such that it arises from a public
program “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good.”).
130
Friedenburg, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 459, 461 (explaining that the court agrees with the appraiser’s detailed findings that although the DEC would permit certain activities on the wetlands, those same activities would not be approved by the Southampton Trustees, the Southampton Zoning Board of Appeals, and the Village Board).
131
679 N.E.2d 1035 (1997).
132
Id. at 1036.
133
Id. at 1041-42, 1043.
134
Id. at 1037, 1042.
127
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had not been destroyed by the regulation because the property could
be used for recreational purposes.135 A part of the court’s ad hoc
analysis on the economic viability of the property was the diminution
in property value. Although neither party presented this argument,
the court nonetheless specified that diminution in property value is
generally insufficient to establish a taking, regardless of the value.136
Time and again, many cases in New York have focused on the
economic use of the property rather than the diminished property value.137 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, in
Putnam County National Bank v. City of New York,138 applied Penn
Central’s ad hoc approach and held that there was no regulatory taking, because the economic impact on the plaintiff’s property was insufficient to outweigh the City’s enforcement of the Watershed Regulations.139 Plaintiff acquired the property for the purpose of dividing
it into thirty-six lots and operating a central sewage system.140 The
City then enacted the Watershed Regulations and revoked plaintiff’s
permit for a central sewage system.141 Subsequently, the plaintiff obtained a permit for an alternate proposal, where the property would be
divided into seventeen lots and operates with subsurface septic systems.142 The plaintiff then sold the property for $1.4 million, and alleged the property value was reduced by 80% due to the regulations.143 The 80% diminution in value had no impact on the court’s
decision, because the plaintiff was nevertheless permitted to significantly develop the property and obtain a reasonable economic return.144 The court reasoned that a regulation could not be rendered a
taking, even if it “substantially reduced” the property value or “deprive[d] the property of its most beneficial use,” so long as the land
was capable of producing a reasonable return in light of the regula135
Id. at 1042 (stating that “a regulation [that] ‘deprives the property of its most beneficial
use does not render it unconstitutional.’ ” (quoting Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594)).
136
Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1042.
137
For cases that have put an overwhelming focus on the “economic use” Penn Central
factor see Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank v. City of New York, 829 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div.
2007), and De St. Aubin, 496 N.E.2d 879, Chase Manhattan Bank, 497 N.Y.S.2d 983.
138
829 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 2007).
139
Id. at 663.
140
Id. at 662.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
144
Id. at 663.
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tion.145
In 2007, the court in In re City of New York concluded that
there was a regulatory taking.146 The court took the ad hoc approach
and weighed the Penn Central factors.147 Specifically, when it evaluated one of the factors— the economic impact of the regulation on
the property— it considered both the remaining economic use and the
diminution in the economic value.148 Together, the regulation prohibiting structural development and the 82% reduction in property value
presented a successful regulatory takings claim.149 Thus, the court
awarded the Plaintiffs $810,000 as a “just compensation” award under the regulatory Takings Clause in the New York Constitution,
which also satisfied the requirements of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.150 Although the Penn Central factors were created
to analyze federal takings claims, In re City of New York’s use of the
same factors shows that the New York State Constitution’s Takings
Clause is comparable to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Furthermore, the absence of a specifically established percentage of
diminution in the value of property allowed this court to apply and
balance the other Penn Central factors.
V.

CONCLUSION

At first glance, the value of Plaintiffs’ Staten Island property
appeared completely diminished because the government regulation
forced the Plaintiffs to leave the property vacant. If the court found
the property completely diminished, the court would have applied the
per se analysis under Lucas.151 However, the court in In re City of
New York utilized an ad hoc approach, pursuant to Penn Central, because the Plaintiffs’ property value was not completely destroyed,
like the property in Lucas.152 Both the Plaintiffs and the City agreed
145

Id.; De St. Aubin, 496 N.E.2d at 885 (pointing out that the landowner has the burden of
showing the regulation prohibited any use of the land that would be “capable of producing a
reasonable return”).
146
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *6.
147
Id. at *3.
148
Id. at *4.
149
Id. at *6.
150
Id. at *1, *11.
151
In re City of New York, 2012 WL 1676889, at *2.
152
Id. at *3.
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that the land retained economic value because they found “comparable sales [where] local Staten Island market investors [were] willing
to purchase properties that [prohibited development] because of wetlands regulations.”153 When the court reached its discussion on the
regulation’s economic impact on the Paollelas, it provided a lengthy
analysis of the remaining economic use of the property and the property value diminution as a percentage. Once the court found that
there was an 82% reduction in value, this value was taken together
with the other factors to find that a regulatory taking existed.154
Regulatory takings permit both federal and state courts to apply the appropriate factors in determining whether a regulation
should be invalidated. Federal courts employ the proper factors for
the per se approach and ad hoc approach, respectively. A regulatory
taking per se requires the regulation to have caused the landowner to
be deprived of all economically beneficial use of the subject property.
Under the ad hoc approach, the court balances the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant, the regulation’s interference with
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action, to determine the degree of interference the
regulation has on the landowner’s use of the subject property.
State courts have the freedom to interpret the precedents set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. Because there is no bright-line rule
as to how to balance the regulation’s economic impact on the landowner’s property, state courts can factor in the reduction of the property value in terms of a given percentage. The absence of a brightline rule may have policy benefits and detriments. In Florida Rock
Industries, Inc. v. United States,155 the United States Court of Appeals
examined some of these pros and cons.156 First, the need for a specified rule stems from the difficulty in determining whether a particular
reduced value in property should justify compensation for a taking.157
The problem with establishing such a rule would be that the government would have to make a payment every time it exercised its police
power.158 While courts have the power to manipulate the magnitude
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at *2.
Id. at *6.
18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1569.
Id.
Id.
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of the regulation’s economic impact on the property owner, both the
U.S. Constitution and New York State Constitution require that if
there is a regulatory taking, just compensation must be paid to the
landowner.
Toni Kong
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